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A 1910 United States Congress repo11 examining the conditions of women and
children in labor across the country, concluded, "The history of women 's work in this
country shows that legislation has been the only force which has improved the working
conditions of any large number of women wage-earners." 1 Nationall y, the U.S.
government recognized that states needed to legislate in favor of women employees to
correct their poor conditions. Women were of primary interest to reformers for their lack
of agency and control of their working conditions. Women were "plentiful in supply,
limited in occupational choice, concentrated at the bottom rungs of the industrial ladder,
and often intermittently employed [they] lacked bargaining power,'' which left them
plagued by insufficient wages, long hours, and bad working conditions. 2 By initially
advocating legislation on the behalf of women, reformers hoped to improve the lives of
all workers. They believed that using legislation for women as precedent, legislation for
all workers could be more easily won.
The issue of protective legislation had existed for a number of years, but it was
not until the Muller Supreme Court decision in 1908 that such laws were declared
constitutional. Starting with Oregon and New York, states enacted legislation that would
place a maximum hour limit, either by day or by week, for their working women. Laws
limiting maximum hours were basic concepts of the Progressive plan to protect workers.3
States began with labor commissions that examined the conditions of working women,
and legislatures used this information to pass protective legislation that had been proven
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U.S. Senate, 6 1" Congress, 2 11 <1 Session. Report on Condition of Woman and Child Wage- Earners in the
United States (S . Rpt 645), (Washington: Government Print in g Office, 1910), 12 .
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5.
3
Melvin Urofsky, "State Courts and Protective Legislation during the Progress ive Era: A Reeva lu ation,"
The Journal ofAmerican /-list01y 72 , no. l (June 1985): 64.

to stand up to a test of constitutionality. Distinguished commissions were created in New
York (I 911) and Wisconsin ( 1911 ), as well as through the Department of Labor study of
the conditions of working women across the nation, generally resulting in some variation
of limitation to the hours that could be worked by employees.
In 19 I 3, Indiana followed the trend and began the work to legislate for a
maximum hour law for its women workers. Although the initial bills failed, the
Assembly created a commission to travel the state and gain data about working women's
conditions with the hope that a recommendation would prompt legislative action.
However, by 1918, Indiana was one of just six states that did not limit the hours of its
women laborers. 4 For Indiana, a state with a strong progressive history, this was
completely out of character. However, it was not for a lack of trying, as Indiana
legislators had attempted to bring protective legislation before the General Assembly in
1913, 1915, and 1919. To an observer, it appeared that the Commission on Working
Women created by Indiana's Governor Ralston in 1913 would place Indiana on the path
to protective legislation like so many other states at the time. Surprisingly, Indiana ' s
commission did not perceive the public interest or the general welfare to be at stake, a
standard that many states used to rationalize the need for such legislation. 5 In light of
Indiana's success with the public utilities commission, this is indeed a moment of curious
failure. My project, "Protecting the Fairer Sex: Indiana' s Failure to Improve the Lives of
Working Women," addresses the circumst;mces in Indiana that led to this unexpected
defoat when similar laws were being enacted across the nation.

4

"Safeguard Urged for Children and Women in Plants," Indianapolis Star, 24 December 1918, 7.
Ulla Wikander and Alice Kessler-Harris, Protecting Wom en: Labor Legislation in Europe. the United
States. and Australia, 1880-1920 (Champaign: University of l llinoi s Press, 1995), 340.
5

2

In an era where protective labor legislation for women was the norm, Indiana
stands out as an anomaly in its negligence to intervene. My research is an examination of
the negligence of Indiana to protect their white working women as well as the underlying
reasons for such failure. The success of maximum hour laws for women has been widely
documented but there has been little scholarship aimed at understanding the breakdown
of legislative action. 6 Historians have generally not considered the causes and effects of
failure in history, but instead choose to focus on the success.
"Protecting the Fairer Sex" explores the refusal of Indiana lawmakers to place the
well-being of their working women above "a can of corn," an accusation that was made
by one state representative early in the legislative discussions. 7 It investigates how the
legislators knew nothing would come of protective legislation in the state, regardless of
their fake expressions of concern. My work tells the story of how Indiana women were
pushed to the periphery of a state that prided itself on its seemingly progressive nature.
Utilizing primary sources from local newspaper articles and the 1913 Indiana House
journals, my work addresses the legislative shortcomings that resulted in the creation of
the commission. Archival records, such as hearing transcripts, were instrumental in
informing my understanding of the successes and setbacks of the commission. My
research was conducted from records located at the Indians State Library, Indiana
Historical Society, and the Indiana State Archives. Additionally, I utilized the
Indianapolis Central Library for newspaper microfilm. Together, these local archives, as
6

For scholarship on the success of protective legi slation, see Susan Lehrer, Orig ins of Protective
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well as numerous secondary sources have aided me in gaining a better understanding of
the commission, both its members and their work, as well as, the public reaction to their
efforts. Historians writing about Indiana have paid little attention to the Commission,
treating it as a footnote in history. This analysis is the first of its kind to study the event
from the beginning of the 1913 House hearing to the final recommendations of the
Commission in early 1915.
A plethora of work has been written about Indiana during the Progressive Era, and
many have labeled the state as progressive, going so far as to write entire dissertations
about Indiana's legacy. However, only certain aspects of Indiana' s progressive history
are celebrated, specifically housing reform, workmen's compensation laws, an
inheritance tax, and the public utilities commission. 8 ln regards to labor legislation,
Indiana was not regarded as progressive. In a majority of these works, the fight for
women's protective legislation is glossed over. Suellen Hoy's PhD. thesis, "Samuel
Ralston: Progressive Governor, 1913-1917" (1975) makes broad claims about the
progressive character of Governor Ralston that, in relation to the commission on working
women, are inconsistent. Hoy argues that during the public utilities commission, Ralston
"had not hesitated to give wholehearted support to a measure that was to redress the
balance in favor of the weak nor had he faltered in the face of opposition." 9 However,
utilizing the same analysis proves inaccurate in light of the commission on working
women. Furthermore, Hoy ' s analysis all but ignores the failure to enact protective
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Suellen Hoy, "Samuel Ral ston: Progress ive Governor, 191 3-1917" (Ph.D. , Indiana University, 1975),
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legislation. Similarly, extensive histories on the State have largel y failed to mention the
commission for working women. 10
Inspired by Sharon Wood 's Freedom of the Streets (2005), a work focused on the
mid-sized town of Davenport, Iowa, my analysis also looks at a handful of similarly sized
Indiana cities and their reaction to impeding government interfe rence in the lives of their
women workers. The use of middling industrial cities, both in my research and in
Wood 's, highlight the importance of the experiences of their citize~1s.

11

These cities were

important for their strong industrial ties, an experience that was the norm for most
Americans at the time. The experiences of citizens in Indianapolis, New A lbany, and
Lafayette were the norm more so than those who lived in Chicago or New York. Similar
to my goal , Wood's work is focu sed on a deeper understanding of one aspect, namely
women's acceptance in public spaces, of industrialized cities, whi le my research is
focused on the conditions of women laborers.
My study also draws from Barbara Springer's dissertation, "Ladylike Reformers:
Indiana Women and Progressive Re form , 1900-1920" ( 1985). Whi le she analyzes the
work of Indiana clubwomen, Springer also addresses a variety of progressive era
legislation, including the fight for women's protective legislation. The 191 3 fight for the
reform of working hours highlighted the class divide of working and privileged women.
Although Indiana clubwomen were incredibly influential in numerous progressive
reforms, they played a n1uch smaller ro le in advocating on behalf of working women.

°
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For scholarship on other hi stori es of Indiana, see: James Mad ison, The Indiana Way, Bloomington, IN :
Indiana Univers ity Press, 1986. Phillips, C li fton. Indiana in Transition: The Emergence o/an In dustrial
Commonwealth, 1880- 1920. Bloom ington, IN: Indi ana University Press, 1968 .
11
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" Indiana City/Town Census Counts, 1900 to 20 1O," STATS Indiana, accessed 17 March 20 14,
https://www.stats. indiana.edu/population/PopTota ls/historic _counts_ cities.asp
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Using her work has given me a greater understanding of Indiana's progressive nature
while drawing a stark contrast between clubwomen's fight for housing reforms as
opposed to the fight for protective legislation. Because clubwomen had been incredibly
successful in influencing progressive reforms, they chose to spend less energy on
working women as a cause for reform. Springer frames Indiana clubwomen as "ladylike
reformers," highlighting their struggle and insistence to maintain traditional gender roles
as wives and mothers in the political sphere. Working class women's decision to take
jobs outside the home weakened traditional gender roles, showing that women could be
contributors in the home. By extension, working women threatened all women's
existence as solely wives and mothers, explaining why protective legislation was not a
top priority for working women. My understanding of clubwomen's lack of enthusiasm
for the protective legislation movement is influenced by Springer. Although I disagree
with her analysis of clubwomen as lacking political agency, her work is nonetheless
important in grasping why protective legislation failed in light of Indiana's progressive
nature.
Prior to 1890, Indiana was a largely rural and agricultural state with a mostly
native white population. It grew from 169, 164 in 1900 to 233 ,650 in 1910, making
Indianapolis the twenty second largest city by 1910 and the ninth largest Midwestern
city. 12 In many ways, the industrial era of the I 890 ' s caught Indiana off guard, as it
"catapult[ed] the state into an unprecedented epoch of both agricultural and industrial

12

"Indiana City/Town Census Counts"
In order of size, the followin g cities had larger populations than Indianapolis, according to the 1910 census:
Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Minneapoli s, and Kansas C ity.
"Population of the I 00 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990," U. S.
Census Bureau, accessed 17 March 2014,
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prosperity."

13

For many medium sized cities, one of the greatest concerns with this

sudden assent to industrialization was the dislocation of finnly established morals in
Indiana society. Indianapolis was viewed as "a somewhat blurry but nevertheless
authentic mirror of Hoosierdom at large."

14

In relation to other mid-size industrial cities,

Indianapolis retained a great deal of its rural charm, but it would be incorrect to say that it
did not experience some of the ills of industrialization. Indiana's location and abundance
of natural resources placed it at an advantage for the types of industries that were
developing at this time. Its natural resources of coal, oil, and natural gas were ideal for
the manufacturing of steel and ready-made products such as cotton clothing, canning, and
laundries. Additionally, manufacturing industries were suited for women because they
repeated the same task for hours at a time and did not require a great deal of skill. 15
Thus, women could be employed rather cheaply, prompting many employers choice to
hire women rather than men for simpler tasks.

16

Indianapolis, once a semi-rural town, became a blossoming and vibrant city. At
the center of the state, "it became the transportation and commercial hub of Indiana. Its
favorable situation drew new industries to it so that in the l 890' s its manufacturing
potential expanded twice as fast as the rest of urban America." 17 Likewise, an
Indianapolis Star ai1icle from 1912 boasted that the city was "a good place in which to
live because we have here, generally speaking, a decent, law-abiding citizenship. The
love of home and a desire for the better things in life predominate. Our people are
13

Richard De l Vecchio, "Indiana Politics during the Progress ive Era, 1912-1916" (PhD . di ss, University of
Notre Dame, 1973), IV.
14
Irvin S. Cobb, Indiana (New York, 1924), 34, as quoted in James Madi son, Th e Indiana Way ,
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 6.
15
Susan Lehrer, Origins of Protective labor l egislation for Wom en, 1905-1925 (Albany, NY: University
of New York Press, 1987), 19.
16
Ibid., 26.
17
De l Vicchio, "Ind iana Politics," 11.
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energetic and progressive and are possessed of a wonderful amount of civic pride." 18
However, by 1910, Indianapolis had passed its zenith and was in a slow, steady decline.
Municipal govermnents noted lndianapolis, "once the pride of the state, became after
1910 scandalously tainted by continual graft and inefficiency. The only 'redeeming'
element in Indianapolis's political malaise was that it was not as bad as that of Terre
Haute an d G ary.

,, 19

As industrialization swept across the nation, creating large urban areas all over a
country that had been primarily rural , American citizens struggled to cope with these new
social issues, such as poverty, prostitution, disease, drunke1mess, and unsafe tenements.
Nationwide, people turned to their governments- local, state, and federal- as an answer
to these societal ills, through a regulation of economic problems, relieving social issues,
and reconciling change with tradition. Progressivism "reflected a growing, if temporary,
consensus among Americans that major changes in the late nineteenth century had
produced unwelcome, un-American imbalances in their society." 20 Reform became the
rallying cry of politicians in both parties during this time, and the "consistent conviction
of virtually all Progressives was that a ' public interest' or 'common good' really
existed. " 2 1 However, "until 1912, no one party, nor a faction of a party, endeavored to
identify itself as the reform wing," when the Progressive party split from the Republican
Party. 22 Although the Republican Party was the majority party in the General Assembly
for more than twenty years, the Republican and Progressive split proved too great to
maintain majority after the 1912 elections.
18

"Why Indianapolis is a Good Place to Live," Indianapolis Star, 24 December 191 2, 8.
Del Vicchio, "Indiana Po liti cs," 16.
20
Walter Nugent, Progressivism: A Ve1y Short Introduction (Ox ford : Ox ford University Press, 20 I 0), 2.
21
Ibid ., 3.
22
Del Yicchio, " Indiana Politics," 43.
19
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Generally, Indiana political parties were evenly matched, "mean[ing] that the
parties had to engage in an exhaustingly endless effort to hold their own ranks and gather
in simultaneously a few thousand more votes from the opposition."23 The high stakes
political game in Indiana made it difficult for legislators to disregard public opinion when
creating and implementing law, as it could lead to a loss in seats for the following
election. The Democrats also faced an ideological divide over progressive issues but
were led by popular leaders such as governor elect Samuel Ralston who were able to
minimize conflict by advocating cautious reform. 24 The Indiana Democratic constituency
"was comprised of those groups who were figuratively and geographically on the
periphery of Indiana society." 25 To garner a larger portion of the electorate in 1912,
Samuel Ralston maintained a rather bland platform, knowing the Progressive and
Republican split was sure to guarantee a Democratic victory. The Democratic strategy
was to "defend their past records, offer a few popularly 'safe reforms,' and avoid the
moral battles and personality feuds ." 26 In the months leading to the election, a poll
showed that on the whole, Indiana residents preferred progressivism, so Ralston updated
his platform "by pledging himself to ... labor legislation," among other things. 27
Additionally, the Party focused more on the small industrial laborer as opposed to the
employer. In his first address, he asserted, "the boy with his pick on his shoulder has as
strong a claim upon society as the boy with his interest-bearing bonds in his pocket. The
man with the tin bucket must not be lost sight of in the rush to bestow favors on the man

23

24
25
26
27

Ibid., 32.
Madison, The Indiana Way, 221.
Del Vicchio, "Indiana Politics," 146.
Ibid. , 166.
Ibid., 167.
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with the iron box."

28

By acknowledging the common laborer, Ral ston made a connection

with nearly 10% of the population, according to the 1910 census. 29
In the end, the Democrats strategy paid off and the Republican and Progressive
split was so deep that in 1913 the Democratic Party had control of 40 of 50 Senate seats
and 95 of 100 House seats in the state legislature.Jo Now, the Democrats had to capitalize
on their promises to enact labor reform. With such a large Democratic majority, it was
more difficult to control and keep the legislators faithful to the party platform. After
gaining office, a legislator had less need for the resources that the party could provide,
and instead looked to his local constituency and area for direction in voting. While the
Democratic Party was run by political boss Thomas Taggart, it was clear throughout the
Sixty-Eighth Assembly that its failures were largely due to the machine failing to
dominate rather than the machine dominating.JI Holding the party together was one of
the reasons that the Assembly failed to deliver on their promises to labor in the 1913
session. Believing that Democrats would always be in control, " the average legislature
felt little need to endure the restrictions of party discipline or heed the commands of his
leaders. ,,J2 This caused a variety of factions to form based on the issues, and led
individual legislatures to "pursue some personal ambition, a local need, or a particular
party commitment."J J
Personal agendas were not the only cause of downfall of the 1913 Assembly
efforts at labor reform. Issues of reform brought with them a sense of political

28

Ibid ., 169.
Frances Doan Streightoff and Frank Hatch Stre ightoff, Indiana: A Social and Economic Survey
(Indianapolis: W.K. Stewart Co ., 1916), 61 . " Indiana City/Town Census Counts"
30
Hoy, "Samuel Ralston," 54.
31
Del Yicchio, " Indiana Politic s," 197.
32
Ibid., 196.
33
Ibid.

29
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ambiguity; what was good for one citizen was not always good for another. There was
no clear-cut "balance between the common welfare and the rights of the individual
citizen." 34 The ambiguity made it easy for legislators to procrastinate and do nothing.
The Democratic Party "had no particular mandate from the people; no enduring legacy of
reform activity; and their constituency was not noticeably liberal or conservative." 35
After thirty years of being the minority in the Indiana legislature, they decided to take
action rather than create passive laws that did not substantially ease the conditions of the
average citizen. They did not feel like they could be associated with a failed legislature,
and believed they could pass reform laws that were both popular and not radical. 36
The issue of protective legislation was one that straddled the Iine between popular
and radical. Protective legislation became popular in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, through the creation of laws that were meant to protect a certain class
of workers. Early on, the legality of such laws was questioned , but after the Supreme
Court's affirmation of the law' s constitutionality in the Muller v. Oregon case most states
made the move to enact such legislation. In 1908, legendary attorney Louis Brandeis
signed on to defend the state of Oregon against Curt Muller, a Portland laundry owner
that required women to work beyond the ten hours that was stipulated in a law passed in
1903 by Oregon ' s legislature. Disagreeing that his employees could not work overtime,
William Fenton, Muller' s lawyer and legal counsel for large companies such as Standard
Oil, believed this law violated his right to freedom of contract, and challenged the
constitutionality of the law in the Supreme Court. 37 In the past, freedom of contract was

34

35
36
37

Ibid. , 197.
Ibid ., 199.
Ibid ., 200.
Woloch, Muller v. Oregon,. 21 .

ll

often what stopped legislatures from enacting protective legislation and was hailed as
"the cornerstone of a fee society."

38

Proponents of this view believed " legi slatures

retained practically no power to interfere with private arrangements between employers
and employee. "

39

Attorney Brandeis argued that freedom of contract could be controlled

by the state to protect the health and welfare of its people. 40 In his famous Brandeis brief,
he worked to prove the relationship between long hours, worker's health, and public
welfare, proving it was in society's best interest to uphold protective legislation for
women. 41
According to Josephine Goldmark, a cowriter of the Muller brief, the changing
technology and subdivi sion of tasks created new strain in industry. Women were
expected to run more and more machinery without the opportunity to vary their work .42
This created an increase in strain and monotony, leading to injuries ranging from cuts to
maiming and scalping. Attorney Brandeis drew from other states decisions regarding
protective legislation and their language of the inferiority of women . Since the early
1900' s, states had been arguing that women were weaker than men. The decision for a
1902 Nebraska law went so far as to say, " Women and children [had] always, to a certain
extent, been wards of the state." 43 Likewise, the 1902 Washington decision upholding
protective legi slation stated:

38

Urofsky, "State Courts," 66.
Ibid .
40
The Lochner ( 1905) deci sion argues that the l 4'h amendment prohibits the government from interfering
in business, and protects the freedom of contract. While the Muller decision was upheld, it was because the
workers in question were women as opposed to men, like those in the Lochner decision. T he Muller
decision, in li ght of the Lochner decision, allowed for the discrimination based on sex of employees. T he
two decisions, just three years apart, show the contlicted nature of the American lega l system on this issue.
41
Woloch, Muller v. Oregon, 3.
42
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43
Ibid ., 57.
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It is a matter of universal knowledge with all reasonably intelligent people
of the present age that continuous standing on the feet by women for a
great many consecutive hours is deleterious to their health. lt must
logically follow that that which would deleteriously affect any great
number of women who are the mother of succeeding generations must
necessarily affect the public welfare and the public morals. 44
Brandeis's argument, like those that had come before him to protect the
constitutionality of protective legislation, was based on scientific facts of the day arguing
that women were inherently weaker than men and thus, as mothers of the race, they
needed protecting from the ills of industrialization. Brandeis maintained that "the
deterioration is handed down in succeeding generations" and "the overwork for future
mothers thus directly attacks the welfare of the nation."

45

Studies of the day proved that

there was a real danger to wage work. In her book, Out to Work: A Histmy

~l Wage-

Earning Women in the United States (1983), historian Alice Kessler-Harris, found that
working women were
nearly always undernourished. Few had sufficient air, sunshine, or
exercise. Those who worked at sewing machines developed spinal
problems, digestive disorders, and frequently consumption. Saleswomen,
forced to stand from 10 to 12 hours a day, got varicose veins. Textile
workers sickened with brown lung disease. 'No girl of 18 can work
without physical injury, sit or stand continuously in the most sanitary
store, laundry, or factory I 0 hours a day without risking her chance for
future usefulness as a woman.' said one expert. Tales abounded of heads
scalped by machines, bodies burned by flying cinders, and hands mangled
by untended machinery. It said that subjecting future mothers of the race
to these evils would produce, in the jargon of the day, stunted and dwarfed
children. 46
With this evidence, Brandeis's use of sociological jurisprudence, through a focus on the
social effects of law, was difficult to argue with. By considering the effects of a such a

41
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Ibid., 58 ..
Woloch, Muller v. Oregon, 3.
46
Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: a His101y of' Wage- Earning Wom en in the Unit ed States (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1983), I 06.
45
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law, or in this case, the absence of protective legislation would have on society, Brandeis
provided a new way for reformers to argue for protective legislation in hopes of reaching
their broader goal , protection by the state of all workers. Contemporary analysis of the
Muller case note that this decision
sharply distinguished what was appropriate for men and what was
desirable for women. Arguing that the state had an interest in women ' s
present and future roles of actual mothers and as 'mother' s of the race,'
the Court upheld Oregon's effort to reduce the hours of women workers.
It thereby inscribed into precedent notions that women, all of whom could
be viewed as potential mothers, constituted a separate class and a proper
subject for legislative action. 47
Over the course of the next several decades, the Muller decision allowed legislation to be
created that limited maximum hours and night labor for women workers. 48
Indiana's Sixty-Eighth General Assembly Session opened on Thursday, January
9, 1913 and on Tuesday, January 14, 191 3, House Bill No. 47 was introduced. The bi ll
addressed the "hours of labor of women" and was sent immediately to the Committee on
Labor. 49 The bill, nicknamed Keegan's bill after Representative John Keegan, a
Democrat from Indianapolis, who introduced the bill , " provided for an eight-hour
working day for women. " 50 In a state that had no protection of women workers, this
legislation was seen as very radical to some. Almost immediately, the bill drew strong
responses from pro-labor and pro-employer camps. Three days after the bill was
introduced, on January l i'\ the Indianapolis Star reported that "the Indiana
Manufacturers' and Shippers' Association wi ll begin a fight ... against" the bill. 51 The
association proved to be a rallying organization for employers who disliked it. Just a
47

Wikander et al , Protecting Women. 338.
Ibid ., 342 .
49
Indiana Genera l Assembly, House Journal, 68' 11 session, 9 January 191 3, 85.
50
" Eight-Hour Day Bi ll Under Fire," Indianapolis Siar, 17 January 191 3, 16.
51
"Eight Hour Day Bil l under Fire."
48

14

week later J.V. Zartman, a representative for the organization, argued that readjusting
women's work schedules would force men to work eight hours too, which would be
costly and lead to an increase in the price of products.s 2 Proponents of the bill , such as
Mr. Tobin from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters rebuked this claim saying,
"Do you not know that Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Beveridge, and Mr. Johnson and your party
platform called for this sort of legislation, for the 8-hour day for women in industry. ,,s 3
Tobin's statement highlighted the push by union leaders to remind the legislatures of
their campaign promises. With the high turnover in the political landscape, these threats
could have a real political impact in the next election cycle.
Employers argued that the bill "if passed, would mean ruin of hundreds of Indiana
manufacturers."s 4 Furthermore, opponents of the bill believed that in relation to the other
states in the area, they would lose a competitive edge.ss Limiting women's working
hours per day would discourage new industries from opening factories in the state, or,
worse, drive away the factories that were already here. In an effort to halt the passage of
this bill, the Manufacturer's and Shippers' Association wrote letters to other employers
they believed would be against the bill and requested their attendance at the House Labor
Committee hearing three days later. s6 During the hearing, many manufacturers protested
the hour limitations that the bill proposed. Some argued that reducing hours would
reduce profits, causing lower wages for the women. s7 A Fort Wayne company believed
there would be a 35% cut in output in his factory and they would be forced to compete
52

"Seek to ' Adjust' 8-Hour Law," Indianapolis Star, 21 January 191 3, 16.
Ibid.
54
"Eight-Hour Day Bill under Fire."
55
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with businesses in "New England, the South, Pennsylvania and Germany, where the girls
work from ten to twelve hours a day." 58
Yet the fight was more than just about competition from other markets. It became
a fight over political ideology and, at times, it was personal. In an Indianapolis Star
article about the hearing, a Fort Wayne manufacturer was quoted saying this about the
bill: "It is not the working people that are so much interested in this bill , but the parasites
whom they are supporting. There is a man living in Indianapolis now, a member of this
Legislature, who pays $50 a month house rent, dresses in the latest styles and lives in
luxury, yet he never works. Such men as this are promoting the bill."

59

Employers

believed the actions of politicians in Indianapolis were imposing unfair laws on them
though they were not affected by its outcomes. It was easy for lawmakers to restrict the
hours that factories could run without incurring any of the possible revenue losses as a
result.
On February 11 1\ the Committee on Labor reported back to the legislature. Of
the thirteen members, only three wished the bill to be indefinitely postponed , while eight
wanted it to pass with some substitutions and two believed it should pass as is. 60 An
Assembly vote was held two days later to decide the outcome of the bill, after a great deal
of debate. Three amendments were proposed, fatally altering the character of
Representative Keegan's initial bill. The amendments allowed for more than a 9-hour
workday, as long as the hours were fewer than I 0 a day and 54 a week. 61 Senator Keegan
was enraged by the failure of his bill, and moved to strike the enacting clause in an effort
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to kill the bill, but it failed to pass. 62 He declared he was resigning as a result of the vote.
The coverage of his resignation made the front page of the Indianapolis Star. arguably
the state's leading paper, where he was quoted saying, "We have an 8-hour law for men
in Indiana and I have resigned rather than remain a member of a body which would
require women and girls, whom men ought to protect, to work ten hours a day- two
hours longer than we ask men employed on state contracts to work." 63 He accused
manufacturing establishments of being the reason that the bill had failed , believing that
they placed "a can of corn" above a human life. 64 Governor Ralston did not accept his
resignation, but his stunt did bring greater publicity to the issue.
The newspaper coverage of the amendments was harsh in Indianapolis. On the
16111, the Star reported:

Speaker Cook engineered a parliamentary coup in the House yesterday
morning by which the fifty-hour-a-week clause in Keegan ' s 'eight-hour
work day' bill for women was stricken out, and the word 'fifty' was
substituted for 'fifty-four. ' The Amendment is a big concession to the
labor element and was put in by Representative Weisman, one of the chief
65
opponents o f t11e measure.
Furthermore, the local labor paper, the labor Bulletin, had a scathing review of the
Legislature and their actions, arguing the defeat "places the legislature on record as
destitute of a proper regard for womanhood ."

66

The article also questions the future

ramifications of the failure of this bill , saying, "What will future generations think of a
state which discriminated against women in l 913?"67 While the paper had relatively
sporadic coverage of the protective legislation debate, the articles they did publish on the
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subject were particularly supp011ive of the law, and similar laws all over the country.
The paper placed blame for the bill's failure in a variety of places. Generally on the
subject of working women, the paper notes, "It is discouraging to note how many people
try to shield the big stores and factories from any blame in the matter, especially the big
daily papers, which could exert a wholesome influence against low wages. These papers
belittle the effort being made to get better wages for women. They purposely evade and
.
misrepresent
tl1e

.

cont~nt1on.

,,68

While the eight-hour bill was a failure, the Assembly did not give up on passing a
law for working women. A substitute measure, known as the Dickinson-Koenig bill for
the representatives sponsoring the bill, was passed in the House on February 22, 1913,
and was proposed by representatives J.R. Dickinson of Huntington and Charles Koeni g of
Fort Wayne, both Democrats. This bill provided for a nine-hour day and fifty-hour week.
Representatives on both sides of the bill argued during discussion that they had received
scores of letters from both women and manufacturers arguing for and against the bill.
Some representatives believed that this bill was solely for the benefit of Representative
Keegan, in an attempt to get him to return to the Legislature. 69 While the bill passed by a
large majority, 65 to 24, more than half of the members spoke about their position on the
bill. 70 The Indianapolis Star highlighted representatives that spoke against the bill ,
quoting those that voted no based on their convictions, their constituents, and for
Keegan 's actions. 71 The Senate referred the bill back to the committee on labor and held
a hearing for the public to discuss their opinions on the matter.
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The hearing held on February 28 111 became largely a personal battle between the
legislators, which took center stage in the Indianapolis Star coverage of the hearing
above the actual discussion about the bill. Senator Robert Glenn Van Auken, a Democrat
from Steuben County, challenged the right of Representative Keegan to speak at the
hearing after Keegan referred to the Legislature as "leprous." 72 The personal
disagreements that occurred during the hearing downplayed the other important
happenings that occmTed, such as American Federation of Labor leader, Samuel
Gompers speaking in support of the bill. Gompers highlighted the benefit of this law was
not just women alone, but for the freedom of employers as well. Because hours would be
lowered, wages could be raised and employers would have a greater pool of candidates
from which to select the best laborers. 73 Although he was in the city to attend that
national convention of the Iron Workers Union, Gomper' s position as a well-known labor
leader made his attendance and speech at the meeting a huge vote of support for the bill.
The rest of the discussion was largely split by employers against women and union men.
A local department store worker, Mrs. G.G. Andrews, testified about the risk women took
when speaking out in favor of the bill, noting that by coming she had risked her
position. 74 It was an uncertainty many women were not willing to take and led to a lack
of women' s voices both in the newspapers and later during the committee hearings.
After the hearing, the Committee on Labor reported back to the Senate that they
recommended the passage of the bill. However, the bill continued to evoke strong
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responses from the legislators and they debated the bill on March 4 111 for three hours
before they voted on it. The public response to the vote was immense. Indiana State
Federation of Clubs president Luella Mc Whirter, realizing the vote was in danger, sent
postcards urging women who were interested to attend the hearing. "Heavy pressure
against it. Come if possible. Urge others. Presence of hundreds of women needed for
influence." 75 Her clipped message highlighted the dire situation of the bill. Senators
voted against the bill for a variety of reasons. Several Senators believed that the bill was
written poorly because it distinguished between men and women, a few went so far as to
argue that the law would adversely affect men by forcing them to work nine hours as
well , and others believed such a bill was unenforceable. As with the eight-hour bill , there
were strong protests from manufacturers and employers of labor that encouraged the
failure of the law. Regardless of those who spoke out in favor of the bill , the bill lost by a
margin of 19 to 29.
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Truly determined to enact a law to limit the hours of working women in the State,
the day after the defeat of the Dickinson-Koenig bill the House introduced a third bill for
working women. This bill was sponsored by Representatives Harry Gardner, a Democrat
from Logansport, and James Fleming, a Democrat from Portland, and would limit the
hours of employment to ten hours a day and fifty-four a week. 77 From the beginning it
was questionable whether the Senate would pass the bill , when a motion to amend the
Dickinson-Koenig bill to the same provisions failed. The bill passed the House on March
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but it was opposed by Hoosier union workers "who declared it to be a mere makeshift

and a compromise at the expense of the working women." 78
Numerous members spoke out on the uselessness of the bill. Representative
James Dunmire, a Democrat from Elkhart stated, " lf I wanted to play politics I would get
on the wagon and support this makeshift law now proposed, but I don ' t believe in making
a compromise at the expense of the working women in this state." 79 He also argued that
the failure of the law was a reflection of the Democratic Party and their failure to protect
women. Representative Koenig declared "Now after bills which would have really given
some relief have been killed, we are asked to vote for a bill which is wholly
unsatisfactory and of practically no benefit. I refuse to endorse such a makeshift with my
vote." 80 Other members were more candid in their responses; Representative Dickinson
simply called it "useless" and Representative George Sands, a Democrat from South
Bend said, "this bill means nothing and will give no relief." 81 Representative William
Patton, a Democrat from Bedford, argued, "the men would not dare to fight laws
proposed in the interest of working women if we had women lawmakers here, and I hope
the day is not far off when they will grace this chamber." 82 In addressing the lack of
political power women had, he highlights an argument that few others did over the course
of the fight for working women. The weak political agency of women was commented
on in a Labor Bulletin article from 1911 , stating a cigar factory in Evansville "does not
frighten law-makers very much as the girls have no votes." 83 Because women did not yet
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have the vote, politicians had very little incentive to anger wealthy businessmen by
limiting the hours of their workers. Most assemblymen, except, perhaps, for Keegan,
were unwilling to risk their political career for an unpopular law with their constituents.
Political parties meant nothing when it came to a law for women, and
representatives voted for their own personal agenda. Often, legislators voting records
were inconsistent, and representatives changed their vote from one labor bill to the next,
such as Representative Charles Bidwell, a Democrat from Sullivan county, who voted
against Keegan's bill, for the Dickinson-Koenig bill, and abstained for the GardnerFleming bill. Furthermore, representatives were not above blaming the failure of the bills
on their own party. Angered by the loss, Representative Keegan publically called
Democratic state chairman, Bernard Korbly, a "paid lobbyist" who was partially behind
the defeat of the previous two bills. 84 Regardless, the bill passed the House, only to fail
in the Senate in early March of 1913.
After the failure of the Dickinson-Koenig bill in the Senate, a measure was
introduced to provide for a commission that would travel the state in an effort to
investigate the conditions of women in labor and aim to represent a variety of interests.
This bill, seen as a concession after the failure to pass a law regulating hours, was passed
by both the House and the Senate. This act was approved on March 14, 1913. The
charge of the commission was to "investigate the hours and conditions of labor of women
in this State and to determine what limitations, if any, should be placed on the hours of
labor of women in any or all employments, or what improvement should be made in the
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conditions under which women labor in any or all employments." 85 It was stipulated that
the commission was to be made up of five members to represent the interests of
employers, women, lawmakers, and the public. These members were chosen by
Governor Ralston and he received numerous letters from all over the state recommending
a variety of people for the different positions. 86 It should be noted that an Indianapolis

Star article recounting the selection of the commission members notes that all the men
. mad e sense to appomt
.
.
chosen for the committee
were D emocrats.87 l n t heory, it
members who had different interests in an effort to make sure the right questions were
asked, however the real problem became that the members just had too many ideological
differences.
The chairman of the commission was Melville Mix , who was chosen to represent
the public. Mix was the president and general manager of Dodge Manufacturing
Company in Mishawaka. Additionally, he was president of the Manufacturers' Bureau of
Indiana as late as 1912. 88 At different times from 1910 to 1912, he wrote for or was
featured in the Indianapolis Star to address issues of the Manufacturers ' Bureau in the
state, making him a well-known person throughout the state. Although he was chosen to
lead the commission and to represent the needs of the public, his background clearly
positioned him towards less restrictive labor laws and away from the protection of
women employees. His connection to the Manufacturers' Bureau, which later merged to
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become the Manufacturers' and Shippers' Association, colored his view of the
commission throughout their work in the state.
Lee Rodman was chosen to represent employers. He was from Cannelton and
was head of Indiana Cotton Mills. Prior to his appointment to the commission, Rodman
was actively against the bill. He was cited in a Star article as speaking out against the bill
during the Senate hearing on the Dickinson-Koenig law.89 H.J Conway was selected to
represent labor. He was from Lafayette and was head of the National Retail Clerks
Union. Like Mix, Conway was also featured in the Star several times for the role he
played in the 1912 Lafayette clerk's strike, as secretary and treasurer of the Union and a
spokesperson for the strikers.
The last two members of the commission- those representing the legislature and
women- were chosen and then replaced before the commission even began. Democratic
Senator Harry Grube of Plymouth was initially selected to be a part of the commission;
however he resigned based on business matters. Senator Grube made the original
proposal for the commission at the beginning of March 1913 but resigned without
specifics at the first meeting of the commission in May. Senator Grube was originally
appointed as the chairman of the commission, and upon his resignation Lee Rodman
expressed concern in a letter to Governor Ralston that his resignation "in the midst of our
investigations, makes our report and findings more vulnerable to attacks of this kind ." 90
Senator Frederick Van Nuys from Anderson, another Democrat, was chosen to replace
Senator Grube. Bertha Lockwood of lndianapolis was chosen to be the woman 's
representative on the commission. Lockwood was active in the community and served as
89
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chairman of the legislative committee of the Women's Department Club of Indianapolis.
She was also a member of the State Federation of Clubs. 91

Lockwood was very well

known among women's clubs, as well as by the Legislature where she lobbied for
refonns centered on women and children.

92

Unfortunately, Mrs. Lockwood died in the

summer of 1914, just a fow months before the commission was set to begin holding
hearings. It was commonly believed that her death was attributed to her work with the
commission. Frank and Frances Streightoff, in Indiana: a Social and Economic Survey,
argue, "Mrs. Bertha J. Lockwood literally worked herself to death on this commission ' s
task." 93 A Star article about her death noted, "Her interest in the work of that
commission [on working women's conditions] was so keen that she over-exerted
herself." 94 Mae Romig Miller was originally chosen to be the secretary of the
commission but after Lockwood's death, the Governor choose to have her fill the vacant
position. Like Lockwood, Miller was an active member of the clubwomen ' s movement
and worked for the passage of the 8-hour law, speaking at the House's committee hearing
for Keegan's bill.
Together, Melville Mix, Lee Rodman, H.J. Conway, Senator Fredrick Van Nuys,
and Mae Romig Miller were appropriated $2,000 from the legislature to travel the state
and hold hearings that would inform the Assembly on the laws that need to be created to
best aide working women. Because the commission was appropriated such a meager
sum, and did not receive a salary for their work, the commission reached out to the
United States Department of Labor to assist with their data collection. The Department
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of Labor report was compiled by Marie Obenauer, who traveled with the conuni ssion to a
number of hearings throughout the state. Her findin gs were laid out in a 198 page report
entitled "Hours, Earnings, and Conditions of Labor of Women in Indiana Mercantile
Establishments and Garment Factories" ( 19 14). The report was officially released by the
Department of Labor in October of 1914, but Obenauer met with the commi ssion during
their first meeting in Indianapoli s in May. 95 Additionally, her report gives an overview of
the commission 's findings, so they were available to other such investigations all over the
nation. The Department of Labor was already in the process of recording the conditions
of women in labor across the United States in the hope of making reconm1endations to
Congress about industrial problems, similar to the charge of the Indiana commi ssion.96
The Department of Labor accepted the commission 's request in a hope that the
cooperation would create uniform methods of classifying and collecting data that could
be extrapolated to other areas in the country. Mrs. Obenauer's report focu sed on the
manufacturing and mercantile establishments in the state, as they employ 45 % of the
30,000 working women.97 This arrangement allowed the Indiana commission to devote
its fund s to corresponding with the other industries that employ women. The Department
of Labor study covered the same ten cities that the commission planned to cover. Ten
cities were chosen in an effort to cover the entire state and represent the experiences of
women in a variety of locations. The cities that were chosen were Indianapoli s, Peru,
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Richmond, South Bend, Hammond, Lafayette, Terre Haute, Evansville, Fort Wayne, and
New Albany. 98
In an effort to gather data from both sides of the question, employers and
employees both were given questio1maires to fill out. Data was obtained on seasons,
hours, overtime, occupations, and earning. Interviews were taken with the employer
when necessary or data was retrieved tlu-ough records, such as payroll, when available. 99
Employees were interviewed for questions of nationality , age, work conditions, and
employment and earnings.

100

The result of this data provided a base of information for

examination of witnesses during the hearings .
While the commission was supposed to start their hearings in the summer of
1914, the death of Belva Lockwood forced them to postpone their visits until September

of 1914. Although they had over a year and a half to collect data, visit the cities and hold
hearings, and create a recommendation, the hearings took just twelve days, spanning
from September 14111 to the 25 111 • In an effort to gather opinions from both sides of the
question, hearings were held in both the afternoon and evening. While these meetings
were open to the public, the afternoon meeting was intended for employers and the
evening for the employees to voice their opinions.
A prevailing problem from hearing to hearing was the lack of discussion on both
sides of the labor question. The labor hearings were often fairly well attended, though
people did not talk. At the Peru hearing, no one appeared during the afternoon session,
and while twenty men and three women attended the evening session, none of them
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spoke.

101

In the two sessions in South Bend, nine men spoke but just one woman voiced

her opinion. Chairman Mix noted that they could 11ot get a ri se out of employees during
the evening hearing, which was devoted to their thoughts on the issue. The South Bend

News Times believed the evening hearing there, "from the standpoint of announced
purposes, resembled a farce."

102

Not one woman spoke during the Richmond, New

Albany, or Evansville commission. An Indianapolis News article recounting the Terre
Haute hearing noted, "A few factories were represented by the employers side, but no one
was present to speak for employes [sic]." 103 A Fort Wayne newspaper the day after their
hearings was titled "Working Women's Inquiry Fails to Arouse Interest." 104
A lack of testimony by employees was one of the largest problems in all hearings.
Mae Miller noted during the opening remarks at the Lafayette hearing that " We are
disappointed in not seeing a larger number present this evening [of women and
employees], however we might add that it has been like this all during the week." 105 lt
was widely theorized that the reason for employee 's poor attendance was related to
threats and intimidation by their employers. This was no surprise as threats by employers
had been noted during the legislative hearings. Conway was under the impression, "the
women in employed in industries today such as stores and manufacturing institutions
have expressed their fear of loss of employment, if they give testimony before these
hearings." 106 Because of Conway 's participation in labor unions, he utilized those
connections to recruit those in local communities who were sympathetic to the bill to
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attend the hearings. However, he received letters from those contacts stating, " unless
they were granted some authority or some credentials they feared to act voluntarily." 107
A South Bend News Times article from the day after their hearing noted that "These girl s
seemingly thought too well of their pay envelopes to hazard it by expressing opinion." 108
Although participation and attendance by employees was an issue, the
commission was granted the abi lity to subpoena witnesses. However, the commissioners,
through a great deal of di sagreement and discussion, decided to not utilize this. Conway
wanted to use John Doe subpoenas, but Rodman and Mix objected. Rodman argued that
they could not force people to testify, and that the average individual had a great
re 1uctance to get up an d spea k .m f'ront o f' a crowd . I 09
Another reason for poor employee attendance was a sheer lack of accessible
information about the hearings. In the week leading up to the South Bend hearing, the
newspaper ran just one twenty-six line article on the bottom of the ninth page about the
event. 110 However, it was not just employees who were unaware of the hearings, in Terre
Haute, Stella Stimson, chairman of the industrial committee for the State Federation of
Women's Clubs, spent the better part of the day inquiring about when and where the
commission would hold its hearing. 111 The poor turnout was more than just a result of
bad newspaper coverage, the working girls in some cities had no idea the commission
existed. A woman testified in Lafayette saying she had visited several working girl s that
morning and when she brought up the commission, none of them seemed to know
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anything about it. She stated, "we have fourteen year old girls employed in our carpet
factories here and yet none of them seemed to understand that there was anything going
on in their interest." 112
The lack of response from employees in the hearings can be largely attributed to
working women's hesitancy to unionize. Without a union, it was difficult to create a
coherent voice on opinions and wants, making it difficult to portray those wishes to the
Legislature. Women's hesitancy to unionize also made it easier for employers to force
them to work in poor conditions. Without collective bargaining, women had nothing to
leverage when they desperately needed better conditions. Women were antiunion
because they believed their time in the workforce was temporary. While Miller made an
effort to make organized labor aware of the hearings, a Lafayette unionist noted, "the
majority of women do not recognize the necessity of organization. They expect to work
for a few years only and then get married.'' 113 Those that did wish to organize had a
difficult time of it, as it was noted during the Lafayette commission that "the largest
employers notified their employers that they would be discharged if they joined the
organization." 114 Social nonns dictated that proper women stopped working after
marriage, as it was a husband's job to care for his wife's needs and women were needed
in the home, so women saw their employment as temporary. In reality, there were
thousands of women who worked after marriage for a variety of reasons, such as injury or
death of a spouse or financial strain. Although the guarantee that work was temporary
was often false, women's antiunion position did not change.
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The overall conditions of women in labor were incredibly hard to decipher. The
Department of Labor's survey had compiled cold, hard facts that were difficult to dispute.
Testimony from both employers and employees included self-proclaimed 'facts ' that
were impossible to verify by the commissioners and must be taken at face value for the
purposes of inquiry. While very few women spoke during the hearings, Governor
Ralston received close to a hw1dred letters and telegrams from working women all over
the state. However, women's opinion on protective legislation was both positive and
negative. Interestingly, women who wrote letters often wished for the bill to be passed ,
while those who telegraphed the Governor did not want the law. While there is no way to
tell why this happened, it is possible that the telegrams did not actually come from the
women.
Losing a competitive edge with men was the foremost concern of women in
regards to a maximum hour limit. Women were paid less than men were though they
worked similar hours, but this law would encourage employers to hire men over women
since they could work longer. Representatives from Ideal Laundry and Dry Cleaning
company telegraphed the Governor, concerned a law would " put [them] out of
competition with men and deprive [them] of positions which are womanly and
honorable." 11 5 The loss of employment as a result of this law could force women into
unsavory positions such as working in a saloon or prostitution. In contrast to wage work
in industry, prostitution could pay as much as $25 a week, and offer flexibility in terms of
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hours and clients. 116 It was a viable option for women who faced a loss of employment
from their respectable positions as a result of this law.
However, dozens of women wrote to Governor Ralston expressing their wish for
shorter hours. They often expressed how much the shorter hours would mean to them.
The few women who wrote about the employment conditions they endured were
startling. A South Bend depattment store worker wrote that many women worked
between 1o and 14 hours, and often have to "offend Sunday getting our clothes a11d
bodies in conditions to work the following 6 days."

117

Work consumed every moment of

a woman's life, making it difficult to attend to personal needs. Another South Bend
woman stated,
you do not understand what it means to work from 10 to 14 hours
every day week in and week out ... These are the very conditions that drive
women into the streets. For when my days have been the hardest, at1d I
was worn out both physically and mentally I left desperate enough not to
do anything ... The men who are fighting this law are fighting it for selfish
reasons. They do not realize what they are doing. Being men they cannot
believe what it means to us .. .The wives and daughters of these same men
. own l"1v111g.
. 118
may someday be force d to earn t11eir
Of the letters that Governor Ralston received, more than half of them were requesting the
law to pass. Although these personal anecdotes were few and far between, women were
suffering and they looked to Governor Ralston for some reprieve.
As it has been previously noted, women's attendance at commission hearings was
mediocre at best. The women who did speak during the commission all spoke about the
importance and need of a law limiting working hours based on their personal experiences
11 6
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of long hours and low pay. Mrs. Lane, a restaurant cook from Fort Wayne recounted her
experience of alternating between 11 and 13-hour work days, including Sundays and
holidays with no paid days off In addition to long work days, she is given no time to rest
and is on her feet all the time. Based on her experience, she noted, "when you stand on
your feet all the time I think 8 hours is plenty for a lady to work."

119

Mrs. Lane also

noted that many girls working in kitchens are not treated well , making it impossible for a
girl to pay room rent and clothe herself on such a small salary.

120

In fact, average weekly wages were a contested topic from hearing to hearing by
commissioners, employers, community members, and employees, as well as a question
that was being surveyed and studied all over the country. Overwhelmingly, studies
showed that working women were not making enough money to provide a decent life for
themselves. The Department of Labor study done earlier in the year was able to provide
the commissioners with accurate average weekly wages for women in all ten of the cities
visited. Utilizing those facts, the commissioners, but largely Miller, were able to
question employers and employees on the topic of wages. The average wage of women
from each city varied from $6.23 in New Albany to $8.77 in South Bend.

121

When

looking at the wages of all the cities, "a little more than half of the women were receiving
rates of pay less than $7 a week, 48 per cent of the saleswomen, according to individual
reports, were earning less than this amount." 122 However, often testimony during the
commission was contrary to this data. Several women in the Fort Wayne hearing argued
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that women in factories and department stores in the city were making upwards of $10 a
week, which was unrealistic based on the Department of Labor data. Threats from
employers or fear of the loss of their position are plausible reasons why these women
would have so severely misrepresented their wages. Similarly, employers were equally
guilty of misrepresenting the wages they paid A garment manufacturer in Tene Haute
told the commission that it was possible for his pieceworkers to make between $16 and
$18 for 8 to 9 hours of labor, a fact that was true for perhaps one small fraction of his
workforce. 123 While average wages were between $6 and $8 in all cities, inexperienced
girls made significantly lower wages when they started. The Lincoln Cotton Mill in
Evansville paid their inexperienced girls just $3 a week, although the representative noted
in the hearing that all of those girls lived at home.

124

However, he acknowledged that he

does not make it a habit to inquire about their living arrangements during the hiring
process.

12 5

A question of wages also brought up the issue of the cost of living, which was
addressed in a number of hearings. Conway attempted to break down the cost of living in
Evansville for an average woman. He accounted $5 .50 for room and board, $0.75 for
laundry, $0.50 for carfare and $2.97 for clothes, recreation and educational activities,
church, and doctor' s appointments, for a total of $9.72 a week. This was several dollars
above the average that girls were making across the state. However, Conway 's expense
budget highlighted a real problem in thousands of girl 's lives. Wages were not enough to
account for all of the expenses that could arise for a young working girl alone in the city .
123
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Seven dollars a week could not account for winter clothes, a daily newspaper, or an
unexpected illness. A day of illness could mean "trips to the pawnbroker, meager
dinners, a weakened will, often a plunge into the abyss from which she so often never
escapes."

126

When looking at the cost of living in Hammond, Miller noted that a girls

" pleasures and education, or anything she chooses for herself, her clothes, are not in
consideration of the average wage of the working girl in Hammond if she does not make
over $7 or $7.50 a week."

127

Because girls made such poor wages, they were forced to

sew most of their clothes themselves in an effort to save money. An Indianapolis Star
miicle titled, " Working Girls and Their Clothing," notes how most women work all day
and sew clothes by night, stating, "The spectacle of a girl who works all day in an office
or factory sitting up half the night to make a garment to wear the next day is one whose
incongruity never strikes the persons who lay down the law for such women."

128

The

article also addresses how men are never expected to come home and work on other tasks
after work, but are able to enjoy leisure "for the restoration of his vitality."

129

Women

simply did not have the time or the money to concern themselves with their 'vitality' .
Leisure and education was another activity that women were forced to forego as a
result of long hours and low wages. With long hours, women had no time for selfimprovement through education. A male union leader noted this in hi s Terre Haute
commission testimony. He stated, " Women who work I 0 hours a day at physical toil is
not going to get much education in the rest of the 24 hours. You take fa ir conditions and a
living wage away from any laboring person and yo u just about kill all the better
126
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incentives that is in that person. I find that the better paid our workmen are, the better
citizens they make and the better employees they make." 130 A lack of wages and time for
self-improvement meant a woman had no means of improving her economic conditions.
Night school was offered in South Bend, but as Miller told her fellow commissioners
although she pushed women workers to go, they simply could not compete or keep up.
"They said by the time they left their work and walked home, because they couldn ' t
afford to ride, and put on a clean waist and came all the way back they were physically
too tired to get any benefit of our public school education. They had stopped schoolthat is day school-to go to work."

131

While the commission was not so interested in the

wages of women, it became abundantly clear that long hours and low wages went handin-hand. Together, they had the ability to break any working girl, often forcing them into
immoral lives of prostitution.
Although employers and women workers had the most at stake, other groups
expressed interest in the outcome of protective legislation. Union men generally argued
for the bill, but because of self-interest. They believed if working hours were limited,
women would be fired in favor of men who had no restrictions on their labor. Indiana
labor unions were not overtly vocal about the bill for women, but they often attended
meetings and hearings, occasionally speaking out for the bill. At the Terre Haute
hearing, Mr. Fox, a secretary for the mineworkers union argued in favor of the law based
on women's more delicate constitution, stating, "It is a well-established fact that eight
hours is enough for a man to work in this country, and why then should we ask our

°
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women to work longer."

132

His statement was filled with patriarchal ideals of a woman' s

place in the home and their physical frailty, but nonetheless articulated his support of a
law that would help thousands of women all over the state. Clubwomen were also
interested in the bill. Beginning in the early twentieth century, privileged upper class
women created social organizations that focused on progressive movements that would
right the many ills of society. In Indiana, the State Federation of Clubs was the foremost
women's organization, and beginning in 1907 took an interest in the conditions of
working women.

133

However, in the fight for protective legislation, a majority of their

work was limited to sporadic lobbying. Clubwomen, like Stella Stimson as mentioned
earlier, often attended hearings and legislative sessions, but in relation to their other
causes, the plight of working women was not a pressing issue.
In contrast to employees, almost all employers were ardently against any form of
protective legislation. One of the biggest concerns of employers was the competition
from other states. Indiana ' s proximity to Chicago, Cincinnati, and Louisville made
employers believe that a maximum hour law would place them at a disadvantage to the
surrounding cities. However, with the advent of railroads and canals, industries in
Indiana were in competition with New England, the South, and parts of Europe.
Employer's argued was that Indiana would not be able to compete with the bordering
states that did not have laws similar to those that were in question in Indiana. A majority
of the cities that held hearings were in close proximity to large cities in surrounding
states. Hammond was close to Chicago, New Albany was near Loui sville and Richmond
was not far from Dayton. Employers recounted tales of the failure of protective laws in
132
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other states, telling of telegraph operators that lost their jobs when a law was enacted in
Ohio, forcing them to come to Indiana for positions. 134 A manufacturer in Hammond
argued that competition was already affecting business, and restricting women's hours
would be disastrous.

135

Indianapolis manufacturers argued that a reduction of hours from

60 to 55 a week would result in a loss of revenue, while Western Union threatened that
128 women would be fired in favor of men employees. 136
Though protective legislation was a relatively new legal route, states all over the
country were creating commissions and enacting laws. While manufacturers claimed to
be the only state in the area considered enacting protective legislation, at the time of the
commission laws limiting hours were already on the books in Michigan, Ohio, Illinois,
and Wisconsin. Michigan limited hours to 54 a week, Illinois had a 10-hour a day law,
Ohio ' s law stipulated ten hours a day or 54 a week and Wisconsin required women work
no more than 10 hours a day or 55 a week. 137 Furthermore, the Department of Labor was
attempting to gain an understanding of the conditions of women in order to inform
Congress of their findings . The push for protective legislation was not just an idea
dreamed up by outspoken John Keegan, it was a legislative tool used to right the ills of
industrialization. Dr. Andrews, a representative of the New York Department of Labor,
spoke before the commission in Indianapolis and addressed those at the hearing in
regards to competition. He stated:
Every time we make a map and put the colors to indicate where different
states stand in important legislation, almost always our attention is called
in that way to the position of a fow of the states . .. It shows that if Indiana
134
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is not going to come up to the standard established by most of the states,
she must enact more progressive legislation on the subject. [tis not a
question so much, as we ~~ve ~eard toni~~t, tha.t if this is done, we will be
put in an unfavorable pos1t1on m compet1t1on with other states. It is not so
much that question of Indiana. It is a question as to whether we are
willing to hold back and fall below the standard already adopted in the
principle industrial states of this country? Really you are hanging back. It
138
is not quite playing fair with the other states.

His statement highlights the crux of the issue about competition; Indiana's disadvantage
would be no different than any other state with protective legislation, which was
becoming increasingly common during this time. It was a question of whether they were
willing to put the women of the state before the men in industry. Employers utilized the
well-established 19 111 century visions of liberty of contract to express their disdain with
the idea of the State coming in and telling them what to do. The Hammond Chamber of
Commerce spoke during a hearing in their city, and while they had not performed any
survey or collected any data, they were under the impression that the conditions of
working women in Hammond were "good and not in need of legislation."
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Rodman

retorted by saying, "a great many people we have talked to on this subject are perfectly
willing to have everybody in the world regulated except themselves."
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Regardless of

facts or the wants of working women, manufacturers overwhelmingly wanted to be left
alone. A South Bend laundry man put it bluntly, "We don ' t want a bunch of people to
come in and tell us what to do."

141

Although there has been relatively little contemporary

analysis of the commission, James Madison, in his book Indiana Way ( 1986), argues that
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Indiana's failure to enact protective legislation could be traced, in part, to a "continual
fear of government interference in individual lives." 142
While it is abundantly clear that the commission had many problems from the
beginning, one of the largest was the commissioners themselves, and clashes between
them were fairly common. An Indianapolis News article noted, "The hearings are often
enlivened by debates between members of the commission, who differ on certain phases
of the question. Mr. Conway, a union labor advocate, and Mr. Rodman, an extensive
manufacturer of cotton goods, often put each other on the witness stand, and their debates
aroused much interest." 14 3 Their arguments were a matter of ideological dit1erence.
Instead of allowing those that attended the hearings a chance to speak, commissioners
disagreed with one another and voiced their opinions on a variety of issues. While they
were not issuing an opinion on a minimum wage law, Miller, Conway, and Mix had an
extensive conversation that covered five pages of transcript on the economic effects of
such a law. 144 Rodman told a labor leader in Lafayette, "legislation cannot create value"
when discussing a minimum wage. His statement speaks to the belief that the state should
not be involved with creating what Mix calls "artificial conditions" within the state
economy. 145 Personal biases on a variety of issues made it difficult for the
commissioners to sit back quietly and listen to the testimony given to them.
Rodman proved to be one of the most biased participants of the commission, as is
evident in his statements about their charge. In the opening remarks of the Lafayette
commission, he made it clear that he found the commission to be worthless. He said:
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the paramount cause for the creating of the Commission was what we
would term a little sop handed to the working girls of Indiana during the
last session of the State legislature, when the bills that they were directly
and virtually interested in were pigeon-holed or defeated, and as a result of
this Commission was appointed to relieve the representatives and senators
from the burden of their responsibility, and as a friend of Rodman will call
146
it handed us a buck and made us the goat for investigation.
'
Rodman's statements were offensive on a number of levels. Calling the commission a
'sop for working girls' demonstrates his belief that they never had any intention of
creating progressive legislation. However, the irony was not lost on everyone in the
hearing and it was commented that Rodman must " not expect very much from this
investigation of Conunissions."

147

To Rodman, the commission's so le purpose was to

placate the working girls. Furthennore, he argues that the c01mnission took pressure off
the legislators, as though the failed commission would leave them less politically
vulnerable. As Representative Keegan's resignation showed , those who truly believed in
the plight of the working girl would hold themselves responsible for the failure.
Apart of other various political biases, Chairman Mix 's position as a prominent
employer greatly influenced his discussions during hearings that led to his failure to enact
protective legislation. In Hammond, Mix argued against a max imum hour law, utilizing
statistics to strengthen his point. He argued, " If they [manufacturers] were working on an
average ot: say, 10 hours and there was a reduction to 8 hours with a corresponding
reduction of output that, in itself, makes a difference of 20%. In wages, that is more than
the profit of the average manufacturing institution, which is less than 7% net. "
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In

South Bend, Mix argued that any legislation that was created would be contrary to
economic law and would ultimately fail should it go against those rules. His statements
146
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were not subtle or unbiased. Surprisingly, newspapers never noted the opinionated
statements that the commissioners made.
Although Rodman believed the political backlash could be avoided by the
appointment of a commission that was nothing more than a commission in name but not
action, Mix had not always believed that it was a politically savvy idea, as a letter written
from June of 1913 to Ralston shows. The letter's tone shows the immense deference that
Mix shows toward Ralston. He disapproves of the appointment of Miller as stenographer
but states "I have no desire to go against your wishes in the matter."
'
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Mix's hesitation

to the charge of the commission is evident from selections from the following letter that
was sent to Governor Ralston nearly three months before the commission began.
I believe that the Democratic part of Indiana cannot afford to take any
action on an important matter of this kind without having the plan,
complete and unvarnished truth before it, nor without knowing that there
is a real and general demand for such legislation from those whose benefit
of such an act would be passed.
As the Commission now stands, it seems to me that the tenor of the
majority report may as well be written without further expense to the
State ... I certainly am too heavily committed in business affairs to justify a
strenuous campaign against a crystallized sentiment with the only hope of
submitting a minority report.
Mrs. Miller' s influence adds only another clincher to the matter. She
claims to represent the Women's clubs of the State which is not officially
disclosed, nor will a canvased membership of this part of the State justify
it. She was the author of the Eight Hour Bill for women workersSenator Grube introduced and championed it in the Senate and Mr.
Conway is the active head of a labor organization having that as its slogan.
There can be no doubt about the attitude of the majority of the
Commission, and it seems that instead of getting an unbiased and accurate
report of the conditions about the State, the Commission will only serve to
give further impetus to the Eight Hour Bill, to which they are all
committed in the next legislature.
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- --Mr. Rodman and myself can make no headway under such restricted
conditions. We believe we have open minds for the investigation of the
hours and conditions of women labor and are desirous of working up a
complete and unbiased report of the facts, which I believe is what you
want and what is in mind when such as investigation was authorized.
I am writing rather freely and from a purely personal standpoint- with the
future of the Democratic party in mind rather than to promote the pressing,
persistent campaign of a class that will switch to either party in power if
they can prove a personal advantage thereby, and who do not represent the
150
composite thought or needs of the people on their particular subject.
Mix expressed an acknowledgment of his opinions against labor, yet argues there is a
stronger a bias towards the legislation. Furthermore, he believes that any actions taken
by the commission should be politically motivated . As has been previously noted ,
elections in Indiana were hotly contested and there was a low margin of victory. The
Democratic Party had a strong showing in the 1912 elections and Mix points out that this
legis lative issue should not become a reason for them to become the minority group once
again . Finally, he addressed the women in question. He views women as a class that was
not politically worthy of legislation. While women could not vote at this time, Mix
seemed to have a foreboding that it wou ld happen eventually, and he did not wish to
legislate in favor of women who could turn against the Democratic Party in the future .
To him, the move was simply too risky.
The commission completed its hearings in late September of 1914, and it was not
until February of 1914 that recommendations were submitted to the legi slature. As was to
be expected, the commissions had a difficult time coming to a consensus and it was
hypothesized that they would likely submit 3, and perhaps 5 recommendations. 151
Surprisingly, media coverage for the recommendations was minimal in comparison to the
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attention given to the failed legislation. 152 Furthermore, there is no record of any
legislative action that was taken after the recommendations were submitted to the
legislature. As was to be expected, Mix reported that "the conditions are being improved
without specific legislation; and while there will always be a short-sighted minority that
will need spurring up, it is quite apparent that education and competition will do quite as
much, if not more, to enforce recognition of such economic principles as may be
accomplished by legislation." 153 Similarly, Rodman recommended, "there is no demand
either from the employers or the employees for restrictive legislation, and the conditions
disclosed by our investigation do not disclose any abuses that cannot be corrected by your
State Inspection Department." 154 Both Mix's and Rodman's recommendations make it
seem as though there were above average working conditions for the women workers,
although their commission hearings proved that it was clearly not the case. Like Mix 's
actions throughout the hearings, his recommendation belittled the needs of women,
calling them a 'short-sighted minority.' Using the language of the day, women who were
considered 'mothers of the race ' were anything but a 'short-sighted minority. '
Looking back at the early days of the legislative fight, Keegan's resignation, and
the verbal altercation on the floor of the Senate between Representatives Keegan and
Korbly, it seemed like the passage of the bill was inevitable. As late as September of
1914, the future for protective legislation still looked bright and the Indianapolis News
wrote, employers "apparently take for granted that legislation of this sort will be
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enacted." 155 Along the way there was a breakdown on a number oflevels, as has been
addressed in the previous discussion. Legislators were too reluctant, commissioners were
too biased, working women were too scared, and employers were too pushy. The
plethora of opinions from legislators, women, employers, and even the commissioners
made it impossible for the 1915 legislative session to act, or for Ralston to force the
passage of a bill.
While Rodman and Mix recommended that competition and education would
correct any poor conditions, the issue of protective legislation was again brought before
the Legislature in 1919, though this event is out of the scope of this paper. The
arguments for hours had not changed since 1913, and women "emphasized the necessity
of legislation that will prevent the exploitation of women and children and the social
menace that is to be found in long hours of labor in insanitary factories."

156

The poor

conditions for women continued, proving that the work of the commission had been for
naught, nor had the recommendations given by Rodman and Mix.
Although the bill failed , the hearings were a joke, and the entire issue became a
political footnote , there is value in examining the failure of this commission. Defeat
cannot be placed on one person or group, the negligence belongs to the citizens of
Indiana. Historians have done a disservice to the working women of Indiana by
forgetting this story. An examination of the commission on working women provides a
more complete, albeit critical , examination of Progressive Era Indiana. The academic
works that call the state progressive fail to address the anomaly of protective legislation
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in Indiana. Party politics and business interests hijacked the commission, leaving it
hopeless of ever becoming something of value.
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Appendix
Table l. Average weekly wages and populations compared by the 1O cities
visited by the commission
Fort Wayne
Muncie*
Hammond
South Bend
Lafayette
Richmond
New Albany
Evansville
Terre Haute
Indianapolis

$8.67
$7.22
$7.05
$8.77
$7.50
$7.48
$6.23
$6.80
$7.62
$8 .01

63 ,933
24,005
20,925
53,684
20,081
22,324
20,629
69,647
58,157
233 ,650

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hours, Earnings, and Conditions o.l labor o.l
Women in Indiana Mercantile Establishments and Garment Factories, 1914, Report 160, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1914), 33. " Indiana City/Town Cen sus Counts, 1900 to 2010." STATS
Indiana. accessed 17 March 2014.
https ://www .stats.ind iana.edu/popu lation/ PopTotals/h istoric_counts_ cities.asp

*For the survey by the Department of Labor, Muncie was studied as opposed to Peru for
an unknown reason. The two cities are about 53 miles apart.
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